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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
WITHOUT ARBITRATION CLAUSES: DOES THE
FINALITY DOCTRINE BAR SECTION 301 SUITS?
by
Ronald L. Mason*
I.

INTRODUCTION

A recent survey of collective bargaining agreements demonstrated
that the parties to those agreements provided for a grievance procedure
that included an arbitration proceeding in 96% of the cases surveyed. 1
In this overwhelming number of cases, the employee may sue an employer for breach of contract under section 301 of the National Labor
Relations Act (the Act), 2 or follow a grievance procedure. In the latter
instance, the employee is bound by the arbitration and its reward. The
application of the finality doctrine to these cases is clear, fair, and
established.
This is not true with respect to the remaining four per cent of
those agreements in which the procedure does not provide for binding
arbitration. The law governing when an employee may sue under section 301 in those situations in which the collective bargaining agreement has not provided for a culminating arbitration is not clear, at
times unfair, and certainly not established. In fact, various courts differ
significantly over the issue of whether the finality doctrine does or
should apply when the grievance procedure does not employ binding
arbitration as a form of dispute resolution.
If, as several federal courts have held, the employee is bound by
the finality doctrine to the grievance procedure as set out in the agreement, then he is barred from litigating the merits of his grievance
before a court under section 301 of the Act. If, on the other hand, as
the state courts have held, the employee is not bound by the finality
doctrine, then it follows that he is not so barred. The Supreme Court
has not addressed this issue.3
This article will review briefly the law applicable to the majority of
cases in which the agreements did provide for grievance procedures
* B.A. Ohio Dominican (1975); J.D. University of Dayton School of Law
(1978); L.L.M.
Georgetown Law Center (1981); National Labor Relations Board, Office of Appeals, Washington,
D.C.
. 2 Collective Bargaining Negotiations & Contracts (BNA) 51:5-7 (1970).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970).
3. Rothlein v. Armour & Co., 391 F.2d 574, 578 (3d Cir. 1968).
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that employed some form of arbitration. Perhaps more importantly, it
will then analyze in greater depth various court decisions that have attempted to resolve the more complex issue: that is, to what extent
should the finality doctrine be applied, if at all, to grievance procedures
which do not include binding arbitration.
II.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES WHICH PROVIDE FOR BINDING
ARBITRATION

Generally, an employee4 can sue an employer under section 301
only after he has first attempted to exhaust the grievance procedure set
forth in the collective bargaining agreement. This fundamental principle was established in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox.5 There an employee sued the employer under section 301 without first exhausting the
grievance procedure. Under the collective bargaining agreement, any
issues left unsettled by the grievance procedure could have been referred to binding arbitration. The Supreme Court held that federal labor policy required individual employees asserting contract grievances
to attempt to resolve the grievances through the procedure outlined in
the contract. 6 In reversing the state court, the Supreme Court found
that the grievance asserted by the employee was not so unique as to
justify an exception to the general rule.8
The Maddox decision was refined somewhat by the Court's later
decision in Vaca v. Sipes.9 The employee in Vaca sued both the employer and the union under section 301. He alleged that he was wrongfully discharged and that the union had arbitrarily refused to take his
grievance to arbitration. The Court cited Maddox for that case's general rule that an employee must exhaust his remedies set forth by the
collective bargaining agreement. 10 The Court then addressed the narrower issue of whether this general rule should apply in those cases in
which the employee seeks judicial review of a breach of contract claim.
No exhaustion would be required under the Court's holding in two situations. First, if the conduct of the employer amounted to a repudiation
4. An employee can maintain a suit under § 301. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967);
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
5. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
6. Id. at 652.
7. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 275 Ala. 685, 158 So.2d 492 (1963), revd. 379 U.S.
650 (1965).
8. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 657 (1965). But see Transcontinental &
Western Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653 (1953) and Moore v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 312
U.S. 630 (1941), in which the Court held that employees were not required under the Railway
Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 151 et. seq. (1949)) to exhaust the grievance procedures provided for in
their respective contracts.
9. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
10. Id. at 184.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/4
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of the contract procedures, then the employee would not have to ex-

haust those procedures. Second, the Court would not require exhaustion in those situations in which the union had the sole power under the

contract to seek the advanced stages of the grievance procedure, and
the employee was prevented from exhausting his contractual remedies
by the wrongful refusal of the union to seek such remedy through fur-

ther procedures.11

The holdings of Maddox and Vaca lead one to conclude that the

employee must exhaust his contractual procedures, unless he can
demonstrate either that the employer repudiated that contract's procedures or that the union breached its duty to represent the employee
fairly.
After the employee exhausts a grievance procedure which
culminates with binding arbitration of the dispute, then, the employee
encounters the finality doctrine. That doctrine effectively bars him from
maintaining a section 301 suit against his employer on the merits of his

grievance, unless he can establish one of the two exceptions set forth in
Vaca.
The importance of the finality doctrine as a bar to section 301
suits was noted in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,Inc..1 2 Employees in
that case were mistakenly accused of dishonesty. The employer discharged the employees on the basis of those accusations. A grievance
was filed and processed through an arbitration committee. 18 The employees lost the case before the committee. They subsequently sued
both the employer and the union under section 301 alleging that the
employer breached the contract and that the union breached its duty of
fair representation. The Supreme Court found that the employees were
not entitled to relitigate their discharges, even though they could offer
new evidence to prove that they were, in fact, fired without just cause.
The Court believed that the finality provision of the contract had "sufficient force to surmount occasional instances of mistake" and that

11. The Court stated:
For these reasons, we think the wrongfully discharged employee may bring an action
against his employer in the face of a defense based upon the failure to exhaust contractual
remedies, provided the employee can prove that the union breached its duty of fair representation in the handling of the employee's grievance.
Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
12. 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
13. Arbitration committees are often used in the trucking industry. While the situation in
Hines was not, in the technical sense, an arbitration, the arbitration committee's decision was
treated by the Court as if it were an arbitration. See id. at 569-72. See Coulson, Vaca v. Sipes'
Illegitimate Child: The Impact of Anchor Motor Freight on the Finality Doctrine in Grievance
Arbitration, 10 GA. L. REv. 693 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Coulson].
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"[tflhe grievance process cannot be expected to be error-free."1 However, the Court also held that enforcement of the finality doctrine was
conditioned upon the union's compliance with "its statutory duty fairly
to represent the employee in connection with the arbitration
proceedings."15
Thus, Maddox required exhaustion of the employee's grievance

procedure remedies; yet, once those procedures are concluded, he is
bound by that final decision. Further, Hines' holding would prevent the
employee from relitigating the. issue in another forum, unless he was
able to argue that one of the two Vaca exceptions applied. This is the
state of the law for 96% of all collective bargaining agreements 6 in
which either the grievance filed by the employee resulted in an arbitra-

tion proceeding17 or when the union refused to proceed to arbitration.' 8
The law here is clear." It is also fair20 once one understands that any
tribunal passing upon this question must consider current labor policy
in favor of arbitration of labor disputes. That policy was announced by
the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers trilogy, 2 ' and reflected the
Court's refusal to grant an individual a right to sue under section
301.22

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
Id. at 571.
16. See note 1 supra.
17. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Santos v. Dist. Council of
New York City, 547 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1977); Boone v. Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285 (5th
Cir. 1967); Miller v. Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 366 F.2d 92 (ist Cir. 1966) (per curiam);
Durabond Products v. United Steelworkers, 421 F. Supp. 76 (N.D. I11.1976); Davis v. Howard,
404 F. Supp. 678 (N.D. Ga. 1975); Alonso v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 345 F. Supp.
1356 (S.D. W. Va. 1971); Davidson v. Int'l UAW, 332 F. Supp. 375 (N.J. 1971); Thompson v.
Monsanto Co., 559 S.W.2d 873 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
18. Cannon v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290 (7th Cir. 1975); Cady v. Twin
Rivers Towing Co., 486 F.2d 1335 (3d Cir. 1973); Harris v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.,
437 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1971); Rivers v. NMU Pension & Welfare & Vacation Plan, 288 F. Supp.
874 (E.D. La. 1968).
19. For a thorough discussion of the possible impact of the Hines decision on the limitations
of the finality doctrine in arbitration decisions, see Coulson, supra note 13. See also Adomeit,
14.
15.

Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight: Another Step in the Seemingly Inexorable March Toward Converting Federal Judges (and Juries) into Labor Arbitrators of the Last Report, 9 CONN. L. REV.
627 (1977); Martucci, Employer Liability for Unfair Union Representation: The Underlying Policy Considerations, 46 Mo. L. REV. 78 (1981).

20.

Hines has been criticized by one commentator for not going far enough to protect the

rights of employees. Note, Finality and Fair Representation. Grievance Arbitration is -not Final in
the Union has Breached its Duty of Fair Representation, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 309 (1977).

21. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers
of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
22. In Steinman v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 476 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1973), the court of
appeals upheld the propriety of the district court's action of setting aside the breach of contract
question until the issue of the union's breach of duty of fair representation had been decided, and

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/4
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III.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES WHICH Do NOT PROVIDE FOR
BINDING ARBITRATION

The issue confronting state and federal courts2" is whether the law
applied to procedures including arbitration should also be applied to
those agreements in which the grievance proceedings do not include
arbitration provisions. 4 That four per cent of collective bargaining
agreements may be read by courts as falling within the law outlined by
the Maddox, Vaca, and Hines decisions. The issue may become even
less clear in those situations where the employee, for several possible
reasons, does not wish to allege that the union failed in its duty to
represent him fairly.2 5
It is not surprising, given the difficulty of this issue, that courts
addressing it do not agree on its resolution. Indeed, some federal courts
have uniformly applied the principles of the Maddox, Vacq, and Hines
decisions. This is most often the case when the employee exhausted a
grievance procedure that did not include binding arbitration. Other
federal courts recognize the potential inequities of requiring exhaustion
in these instances. They, too, nevertheless have been unwilling to grant
those employees broad access to the courts uader section 301. The state
courts, in contrast, have not been consistent in barring such actions.
A.

The Federal Courts

The leading federal court case was decided by the fifth circuit in
Haynes v. United States Pipe and Foundry Co."6 In Haynes, a discharged employee processed his grievance through a four-step procedure. The grievance, however, was ultimately denied at the fourth step
by the plant manager. The collective bargaining agreement provided
for a fifth step; that step, however, would have necessitated a plant
worker's strike in protest of the plant manager's decision. No strike
took place. The agreement further provided that if no strike occurred,
the decision of the plant manager would be final and binding. Thus, the
affirmed the lower court's holding for both union and the employer when the lower court found
that no breach of representational duty had occurred.
23. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to hear actions filed .under
§ 301. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
24. When an action is brought in state court under § 301, the "federal common law" of
labor management relations is applied. See Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 45657 (1957).
25. For example, the union could request a strike vote from the grievant's fellow employees,
but they could, though believing the validity of his claim, decline to strike. It is also true that
many contracts contain "no-strike" provisions, but the quid pro quo for such terms is usually an
agreement to arbitrate grievances. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455
(1957).
26. 362 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1966).
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employee subsequently filed suit against the employer in state court.
The action was then moved to federal court based upon the jurisdictional provision of section 301. The district court dismissed the action.
It did so because of its belief that the union, by signing the collective
bargaining agreement as the employee's agent, expressly agreed to the
particular grievance procedure as the exclusive method by which such
disputes would be settled. The employee appealed.
In its opinion, the fifth circuit found Congress to have provided
explicitly in section 203(d)27 that the method agreed to by the parties
should be the means of settling grievances. In so doing, the court examined the legislative history of section 203(d). It noted that Congress
had refused to prescribe compulsory arbitration due to its belief that
the federal government should not dictate to the parties the particular
method for dispute settlement.28 The court went on to note that the
Supreme Court had consistently sanctioned whatever dispute resolution
procedure the parties had chosen. The only evidence of that choice was
what was contained in the collective bargaining agreement. In the fifth
circuit's opinion, the Steelworkers trilogy2" was indicative of the Supreme Court's approval of selective arbitration procedures. Interestingly, Maddox was cited as well for the proposition that the parties to
a collective bargaining agreement are limited to that agreement's remedies. Finally, the court did note, however, that Smith v. Evening News
Ass'n s° provided some basis for the Supreme Court's endorsement of
the employee's right to sue under section 301 when the agreement did
not provide for a grievance or arbitration procedure.
Another issue remained. Was the plant manager's decision "final"
and, therefore a bar to the employee's section 301 action? The employee had urged on appeal that Maddox did not bar his suit, since
once the employee exhausted his grievance procedure (which contained
no arbitration clause), he could sue under section 301. No direction
was to be found from any previous Supreme Court cases, so the answer
for the fifth circuit was unclear.8 1 Instead, the court looked to two sixth
circuit decisions which held employees were barred from filing section
301 suits even if the union had refused to process the grievances. 2
Once again, the court found the agreement's terms compelling. That
agreement expressly provided for the plant manager's decision to be

27. 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1970).
28. Id. at 416 & 416 n.2.
29. See note 20 supra.
30. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
31. Haynes v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 362 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1966).
32. Simmons v. Union News Co., 341 F.2d 531 (6th Cir. 1965); Union News Co. v. Hildreth, 295 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1961).

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/4
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final, unless the work force struck. The union, in effect, acquiesced in

the plant manager's decision by refusing to strike over the matter. In
holding the parties so closely to the agreement, the court recognized
the employer's affirmative defense that the employee was barred for a
section 301 action, because the decision obtained at the close of the

grievance procedure was final and binding.
Only the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has
addressed this issue at the federal appellate level. When confronted
with the issue, however, the court managed to avoid it. In Rothlein v.
Armour & Co.,8a certain employees sued under section 301. Again, the
grievance procedure contained no provision for arbitration. The suit
sought an accounting and payment of money allegedly owed to the employees under the terms of a pension plan. That plan had been established under a prior collective bargaining agreement. Once again, although the plant employees had the right to strike over this issue, they
chose not to exercise that right. Instead, the employees sued the company for breach of contract. Citing Haynes as adequate authority, the
district court granied summary judgment for the company. Once again,
filing the grievance had exhausted the remedies available to the employees. The district court bound them to that decision.
The third circuit, however, reversed." Nevertheless, the court did
not hold that an employee had a right to sue under section 301 when
the agreement did not provide for binding arbitration. Instead, it remanded the case to the district court for a determination as to whether
the particular dispute was a matter contemplated by the parties as subject to the grievance procedures. The circuit court sought to guide the
lower court in making its determination, if it should happen to find that
the employees had, in fact, obtained a final decision through the grievance procedures in the contract.3 5 First, the circuit court refused to apply the finality doctrine as a complete bar to employees in non-arbitration cases, regardless of the employee's claim.3 6 In place of the finality
doctrine, the court proposed that the lower court consider "in some detail" whether it should accept the decision made pursuant to the contract. Further, the district court was directed to balance the rights of
the few (the complaining employees) against the rights of the many
("all of the employees who have a collective interest in the bargaining

33.
34.
35.

268 F.Supp. 545 (W.D. Pa. 1967), revd. 391 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1968).
391 F.2d 574 (3d Cir. 1968).
Id. at 578-79. The court raised the issue of whether the parties had followed the correct

grievance procedure because the employees were seeking an accounting and payment of money
owed them under a pension plan that was established in a prior agreement. The circuit court left
it to the district court to decide which grievance procedure was applicable. Id. at 577-78.
36. Id. at 579.
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position of their union and the integrity of the contract")."
The third circuit's position is significant in at least one respect. It
may allow other lower courts a substantial degree of flexibilty when
hearing section 301 cases of this nature. The court hesitated, however,
3
to open the courthouse doors for "run-of-the-mill" disputes. This balancing of interests and concern for opening the doors to relatively petty
litigation are legitimate problems. The district courts, however, may
find themselves in a quandary when they attempt to discern, much less
balance, the competing interests. Nor is the task of discernment any
easier with respect to distinguishing "petty" litigation from that which
presents significant legal issues.
Fortunately, the Rothlein case has been illuminated to some degree by the third circuit in a more recent case. In Bieski v. Eastern
Automobile ForwardingCo.,3 9 the plaintiffs sought "dovetailing" rights
from M & G Convoy, Inc.. They alleged that M & G Convoy had
acquired their previous employer, Eastern. Eastern subsequently went
out of business and left them unemployed. The former employees of
Eastern filed a grievance that was processed to the nion-management
joint committee. 0 After that committee unanimously held that M & G
Convoy had not acquired Eastern, the employees sued under section
301. Here, then, the third circuit was presented with the finality issue
in an arbitration setting, and was asked to determine whether the employees were barred from raising the grievance in federal court once
the committee had rendered its final decision. The court, citing Rothlein as support, stated that it would assert the finality rule only:
[i]f the court is convinced both that the contract procedure was intended
to cover the dispute and, in addition, that the intended procedure was
adequate to provide a fair and informed decision, then the review of the
merits of any decision should be limited to cases of fraud, deceit,1 or instances of unions in breach of their duty of fair representation.4
The adequacy and fairness standard seems to be less than the union's
duty of fair representation. In light of that disparity, whether this additional test can withstand review by the Supreme Court is certainly
problematic given that Court's Hines decision. The additional test
might, however, be valid for cases in which there is no arbitration

37.

Id. at 580.

38. Id. at 579. It should be noted that the court cited the situation in Haynes (see note 31
supra and accompanying text) as an example of a run-of-the-mill grievance. Id. at 579 n.23.
39. 396 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1968).
40. Id. at 36. This committee was composed of an equal number of union and employer
representatives and a decision by the committee was considered final and binding on all parties.
Id. at 34.
41. Id. at 38 (emphasis added).
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clause, thus allowing district courts to give greater scrutiny to the
grievance process.' 2
The only federal court decision discussing both Rothlein and
Bieski in the context of a non-arbitration grievance procedure suit
under section 301 is Safely v. Time Freight, Inc..4" The district court in
that case adhered closely to the holding in Haynes by refusing "to examine the merits of the grievance unless some exception to the general
rule [of finality] is applicable."" The district court cited Vaca for the
general exception applicable when the union breaches it fair representation duty. The employee had alleged no such breach before the district court. Thus, the district court duly noted the Rothlein exception
for cases in which the grievance procedure was inadequate or unavailable. It did not, however, rule on the matter. Instead, it cited Bieski as
the final exception to the finality rule. This exception appealed to the
district court, as it allowed review of the reasonableness of the private
decisionmaker's "jurisdictional" refusal to hear the grievance. 5
The district court's plight in Safely is a prime example of the
quandary in which courts have been left following the third circuit's
refusal to confront the finality doctrine in a nonarbitration setting. District courts are now able to assert a very selective "jurisdictional" review of grievance procedures.' 6 This type of selectivity and exceptionmaking ultimately places a premium on the district court's scanning
cases in search of those which have facts the same as or similar to
those before it. The third circuit's refusal, in other words, has forced
the courts to pigeon-hole certain cases into certain narrow exceptions.
The seventh circuit court of appeals has not been presented with
the issue directly. It has cited Haynes in only two situations. In both of
these, the grievance procedure did culminate in some form of binding
42. The court held that if an arbitrator refuses to consider the merits of a dispute, then a
court is the proper forum for reviewing the reasonableness of this refusal. Id. at 34. See also John
Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-51 (1964), where the Court seems to indicate that
the duty to arbitrate is not derived solely from an express contractual agreement to do so.
43. 307 F. Supp. 319 (W.D. Va. 1969).
44. Id. at 324.
45. Id. at 323-24. The court also stated that if
[T]he grievance has never been considered on the merits by a committee whose decision is
to be "final and binding," this court has no authority (by statute, case law or federal policy) to dismiss this suit without making an inquiry into the merits of the grievance.
Id. at 325. Note that if the court had found the private decision maker's ruling was on the merits
of the grievance, it could not have independently reviewed the merits because of the finality doctrine. Hines v. Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
46. See Judge Seitz's dissent in Bieski in which he points out that the courts will obviously
consider some grievance decisions by arbitrators to be incorrect, but that is the price that must be
paid for according finality to non-judicial decisions.
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arbitration. In Ford v. General Electric Co.,4 7 employees sued as a
class to recover wages allegedly due them under the collective bargaining agreement. Previously, a grievance had been filed with the union,
and was processed to arbitration. The contract required mutual agreement between the union and the company in order to arbitrate a dispute. The union had the right to issue a strike notice within thirty days
of the final step in the grievance procedure. If it failed to do so, the
issue was considered settled. No such notice was filed, and this inaction
became the significant factor in the seventh circuit's decision. It ruled
tltat the employer's decision was final. The court then affirmed summary judgment in favor of the employer.
The court in Ford, however, questioned Haynes insofar as that
case barred court action subsequent to the employer's decision and the
union's failure to take strike action:
With all respect, we question whether such a result accords with congressional policy, since it either leaves the settlement of disputed contract rights to a test of economic strength, or makes a strike 8the price of
an opportunity for an impartial adjudication of the dispute.'
The seventh circuit was again presented with an employee suit in
In Re Jackson."' The collective bargaining agreement again provided
for a grievance and arbitration procedure. Uniquely, however, the employee in Jackson had petitioned the referee for relief under Chapter
XIII of the Bankruptcy Act. The referee ordered the employee to deduct an amount from the employee's wages and to pay that amount to
the trustee. The employer complied with the order, but notified the employee that pursuant to the contract, he would be suspended and eventually terminated, unless the referee's order was released. The employee sought a petition with the referee to enjoin this action. He was
successful. The seventh circuit reversed on the basis that the case
clearly involved application and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, any disciplinary action taken by the employer was subject to review through the contract's grievance and arbitration procedure. Citing Haynes, the circuit court said: "when a
dispute arises within the scope of a collective bargaining agreement, the
parties are relegated to the remedies which are provided in such
agreement." 5
The employee in Jackson failed to attempt exhaustion of his remedies under the contract's grievance procedures. This reliance on Haynes
47. 395 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 159.
49. 424 F.2d 1220 (7th Cir. 1970).
50. Id. at 1222.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/4
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was not, however, a complete endorsement of the result in that case.
An employer before the seventh circuit who seeks to raise Haynes and
Jackson as authority for support in a non-arbitration setting should beware. That court has yet to address the question in such a setting.
The two most recent federal court decisions that have met this issue in a non-arbitration setting have set out the law in a general manner with respect to a section 301 action in which the agreement did not
provide for arbitration. A federal district court granted the union's motion for summary judgment in Olsieski v. Transco Plastics Corp..5 1
This followed from the court's finding that the employee had presented

no evidence of the union's alleged breach of its representation duty.
Nor did the court need to reach or discuss the effect of such a ruling in
an employee's suit against the employer.52
Frame v. B.F. Goodrich Co.5" did discuss, however, the effect of
such a ruling. That case involved a retired employee who sued his former employer under section 301 without any allegation of union wrongdoing. The plaintiff had filed a grievance before he brought his court
action. His grievance alleged that the company owed him money under
his retirement entitlements. Binding arbitration was provided for in the
grievance procedures only in ihe event that the parties failed to agree.
Thus, the district court was presented squarely with the issue of
whether the plaintiff could maintain his suit after he had exhausted the
grievance procedure. The court granted summary judgment to the employer holding that "absent a showing of a breach of the union's duty
of fair representation, disposition of a grievance pursuant to an exclusive method provided in the collective bargaining agreement is final.""
This decision illustrates clearly the harsh realities of applying the
finality doctrine to an "ordinary" grievance. The plant manager in
Frame made a decision concerning the retirement benefits of the plaintiff. The union had represented the plaintiff fairly and adequately. In
the final analysis, the employee was pitted in an economic test of
strength with the employer, and lost.
B.

The State Courts
The state courts have not followed the federal courts. Unlike their

51. [19711 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (Lab. Cas.) 1 12,059.
52. In an arbitration setting, this ruling would have also terminated the plaintiff's case
against the employer because a finding that the union breached its duty of fair representation is
an essential prerequisite to holding the employer liable for breach of contract. Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976); Steinman v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 476 F.2d 437
(2d Cir. 1973).
53. 453 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
54. Id. at 66.
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federal counterparts, the state courts have consistently permitted employees to proceed under section 301 after the employees have exhausted procedures which did not include binding arbitration.
The leading state court case is Breish v. Ring Screw Works." In
that case, the Michigan Supreme Court specifically disagreed with the
fifth circuit's reasoning in Haynes. In Breish, the employee was discharged because of an alleged theft. He filed a grievance, and, at each
of the three steps of the procedure, the employer denied the grievance.
The collective bargaining agreement provided for a union strike as a
final recourse. The members voted against a strike. Therefore, the employee sued the employer and the union in state court under section
301.56 The union removed the cause of action against it to federal
court,5 7 where that court granted the union's motion for summary judgment. The state court subsequently granted the employer's summary
judgment motion. That decision was based upon the conclusion that the
employee was required to establish under Vaca that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation.
The employee appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. It did
not do so, however, on the grounds that the employee had failed to
establish an element of his case. Rather, it applied the finality doctrine
to hold that in a case in which the agreement did not provide for binding arbitration, the employee was bound by the decision reached at the
conclusion of the grievance procedure."
Therefore, the Michigan Supreme Court could not avoid passing
upon the appeals court's ruling. In its review of the federal common
law, the supreme court found two exceptions to the finality doctrine. 9
The first exception, of course, concerned the union's duty of fair representation as established in Vaca and reiterated in Hines. The second
exception occurred if the grievance procedure was inadequate in providing for a fair decision on the grievance's merits. It was this second
exception that the supreme court noted in the third circuit's decisions
in Rothlein and Bieski. As it duly noted that the United States Supreme Court had not addressed the issue directly, the Michigan high
court believed that the Court had put its imprimatur on this exception.
55. 397 Mich. 586, 248 N.W.2d 526 (1976).
56. State courts have concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts to hear suits brought under
§ 301. See note 23 supra.
57. 397 Mich. at 590, 248 N.W.2d at 528. The employer evidently did not request removal
of the employee's suit to federal court the district court, upon the employee's motion, remanded
the action against the employer to the state court. Id.
58. Breish v. Ring Screw Works, 59 Mich.App. 464, 468-70, 229 N.W.2d 806, 808-09
(1975), revd. 397 Mich. 586, 248 N.W.2d 526 (1976).
59. State courts are required to apply "federal common law" for suits brought under § 301.
See note 24 supra.
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When it referred to Congressional intent in Hines, the Court stated:
Congress has put its blessing on private dispute settlement arrangements

provided in collective agreements, but it was anticipated, we are sure,
that the contractual machinery would operate within some minimum
levels of integrity. 60

The Michigan court additionally cited Maddox and the Steelworkers
trilogy in support of its view that the second exception exists to permit
review of the grievance's merits in those instances where the court finds
the grievance procedure inadequate.6"
Applying this second exception to the case before it, the Michigan
court held a grievance procedure that provides as its final step a strike
vote by the grievant's fellow employees is inadequate to provide the
grievant with a procedurally fair decision. The court believed that this
procedure placed the employees "in a legally unacceptable position.""
That is, even if the fellow employees agreed with the grievant's position, they would not be readily willing to risk their own economic and
employment status by striking. Application of the finality rule in such a
situation struck the court as a denial of basic justice inasmuch as it
placed the grievant's judges (the union membership) in a position
which conflicted with his.
The Michigan court took direct issue with the fifth circuit's holding in Haynes. It questioned the soundness of the fifth circuit's application of the finality doctrine to a non-arbitration situation. Nor did it
agree with the fifth circuit's reading of section 203(d) as a sanction for
any grievance procedure chosen by the parties." Application of the
finality doctrine to situations in which the final step was a strike vote
did not, in the court's opinion, operate "within the minimal level of
integrity mandated by the Supreme Court in Hines.""
While the Michigan Supreme Court did expand the second exception to the finality doctrine, its reliance upon the United States Supreme Court's language is tenuous at best. The discussion in Hines of
minimal levels of integrity was in reference to a union's breach of its
duty to fairly represent the employee. It was not in reference to a contract grievance procedure for which the union and the employer had
bargained collectively. Any other interpretation reads the Court's language out of context.

60. Hines v. Anchor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976).
61. Breish v. Ring Screw Works, 397 Mich. 586 n.ll, 248 N.W.2d 526 n.II (1976).
62. 397 Mich. at 603, 248 N.W.2d at 534.
63. 397 Mich. at 608-09, 248 N.W.2d at 536-37.
64. 397 Mich. at 609, 248 N.W.2d at 537 (quoting Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc.,
424 U.S.by
554,
571 (1976)). 1981
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This criticism is equally applicable to the Michigan court's reliance on Maddox and the Steelworkers trilogy. Its reliance upon Rothlein and Bieski, however, is proper. In those cases, the third circuit
proposed, but did not adopt, a review of the grievance procedure's adequacy. It was unwilling to risk flooding the lower courts' dockets with
"run-of-the-mill" grievances. The Michigan court, in contrast, was not
as timid.
Two other state courts have addressed this issue, but have chosen
to resolve it by means other than the exception to the finality doctrine
upon which the Breish court relied. Rather, these courts distinguished
Haynes on the basis that the cases before them had no contracts in
which the grievance procedure was to be final and binding.
Hansel v. ParkerSeal Co." involved a section 301 suit by an employee against the union and the company. The employee had already
exhausted his grievance procedure which did not include binding arbitration." After the court found that there existed no breach by the
union of its duty of fair representation, it addressed the more important
issue: whether the employee was bound by the decision of the grievance
procedure even though that procedure did not provide for binding arbitration. The court distinguished Haynes on the grounds that that case
passed upon an agreement in which the parties had specifically agreed
that the decision of the plant manager would be final and binding. The
contract in Hansel contained no such finality provision.
The grievance procedure at question in Local Lodge No. 1426,
LA.M. v. Wilson Trailer Co. 67 did not contain a provision for binding
arbitration. The Supreme Court of Iowa was presented in Local Lodge
with a situation in which the employee had again exhausted his contractual three-step grievance procedure. Similarly, the final step was to
be a strike by the union, if it so voted. Important to the Iowa court,
however, was the omission in the contract of a provision that would
have made the procedure's decision final in the event that a strike did
not take place. It was upon this factual difference that the court distinguished Haynes:

The agreement in the present case does not expressly make the right to
strike the only remedy of the union after exhaustion of grievance procedures, and the bargaining history does not show any such limitation was
intended. Therefore we hold that the union and Lourens are not barred

65.

514 S.W.2d 673 (Ky. 1974).

66. The grievance procedure did provide for a recommendation by a mediator. The mediator recommended the employee's reinstatement but the employer chose not to follow his recommendation. Id. at 674.

https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/4
67. 289 N.W.2d 608 (Ia. 1980).
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from having the courts decide the dispute. 60
IV.

CONCLUSION

The fifth circuit's decision in Haynes set forth the application of
the finality doctrine to section 301 suits in which the employee had
previously exhausted his grievance procedure. The inequities of applying that doctrine to section 301 suits in a non-arbitration setting, however, are considerable. Determination of the employee's rights in these
situations should not be, as the seventh circuit noted in B.F. Goodrich,
a test of economic strength. Any finding that the employee must rely
upon his fellow members to strike in order to benefit his rights is unfair
and inadequate.
Employers, on the other hand, would argue that the union bargained for the very contract which an individual now claims does not
provide him with fair and adequate procedures. The employer may
have had to forego something of value during the contract negotiations,
because the union might have struck to obtain a grievance procedure
which was more favorable. Viewed in this manner, the Haynes decision
seems less inequitable. The result is one for which the union bargained
and the employees accepted.
The Michigan Supreme Court, nevertheless, was unwilling to accept this very argument in the Breish case. It refused to recognize the
finality of a decision not to strike, a decision which was, in the court's
opinion, unduly weighted against the employee. This was a conflict of
interest so great as to deny the employee the basic justice to which he
was entitled under any fair grievance procedure.
While judicial economy is a valid consideration, the fact remains
that section 301 is a statutory right to sue for breach of contract. The
Supreme Court has applied that right to individual employees." It is
true that the Court has limited this right through the finality doctrine
to decisions derived from a grievance procedure's award. The employee
is denied, nevertheless, any forum for his grievance in those instances
where there exists no provision for binding arbitration in the grievance
procedures. The consequences of such an application of the finality doctrine are considerable. They should render the remedy provided in such
non-arbitration agreements inadequate and proper for review by an impartial forum.

68.

Id. at 611 (emphasis added).
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